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STATEMENT OF JURISIDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). The
Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to this Court pursuant to an order dated
November 16, 2011 and filed on November 17, 2011. [R. 946-47.]
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
Issue for Review: Plaintiff Neil Breton was the trustee of a Trust. In February
2005, Plaintiff made the decision to pay off twelve of the Trust beneficiaries in exchange
for releases. Plaintiff made this decision with full knowledge that the remaining three
beneficiaries (the "Slater Brothers"), with whom Plaintiff had had a bitter and litigious
history, were still free to sue him. Plaintiff claims that eliminating the twelve "releasing
beneficiaries" gave the Slater Brothers an economic incentive to sue Plaintiff for
mismanagement of the Trust. Plaintiff further claims the Slater Brothers' lawsuit caused
him damages in the form of attorneys' fees and settlement sums paid to the Slater
Brothers. Plaintiff now blames Defendants for creating the alleged economic incentive
even though Plaintiff is the one who knowingly paid off the other twelve beneficiaries.
The Slater Brothers all testified that the alleged economic incentive played no role in
their decision to sue Plaintiff, and there is no evidence to suggest that the Slater Brothers
would not have sued Plaintiff without the alleged economic incentive. Did the trial court
properly rule that Plaintiff does not have sufficient evidence that Defendants' alleged
negligence caused Plaintiffs alleged damages to submit his claims to a jury?
Standard of Review:

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court

reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. Christens en & Jensen, RC. v.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

Barrett & Dairies, 2008 UT 64, \ 19, 194 P.3d 931. This Court reviews the facts and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. This
Court should "determine only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law
and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material
fact.55 Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted).
Preservation: The parties raised this issue in their summary judgment briefing.
[R. 210-402, 403-05, 414-16, 417-667, 668-904, 908-921.]
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules that are
determinative of the issue on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION
BELOW.
Plaintiff sued his former lawyer and law firm in 2009 for breach of contract and

negligence based on alleged legal malpractice. [R. 2-11.] The Complaint alleged that
Plaintiff, co-trustee of a "Trust," retained Defendants in connection with his desire to
make "gifts" to the 15 beneficiaries of the Trust and thereby to resolve any potential
claims those beneficiaries had against Plaintiff. [R. 3, 6.] The Complaint alleged that
Defendants prepared release documents that 12 out of 15 Trust beneficiaries signed.
Plaintiff claims Defendants were negligent in drafting the release documents and in
failing to properly advise Plaintiff. [See generally R. 3-10.] Plaintiff further alleged that,

2
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as a result of the alleged negligence, the Slater Brothers sued him and that he spent
approximately $900,000 in litigation fees and settlement payments as a result. [R. 7.]
Defendants initially moved to dismiss the Complaint, arguing the Complaint failed
to plead facts showing the required causal link between the alleged breach/negligence and
damages. [R. 16-70, 74-76, 102-14.] The trial court denied Defendants' motion. [R.
126-27.]
The parties conducted extensive fact discovery. [See e.g., R. 1, 161-62, 165-66,
167-69, 170-72, 173-75, 181-82, 183-91, 192-200, 201-09.] After obtaining affidavits
from two of the beneficiaries who sued Plaintiff, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, arguing that Plaintiff could not support his causation theory with evidence.
[R. 210-402, 403-05.] Fact discovery was then extended to accommodate depositions of
the Slater Brothers. Fact discovery closed on April 15, 2011. [See R. 406-08, 412-13,
Amended Scheduling Order.]
Defendants then filed their renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 414-16,
417-667.] After extensive briefing and two hearings, the trial court granted the motion by
order dated September 16, 2011. [R. 932-35.] The trial court ruled that when Plaintiff
paid $24,000 to each of the 12 beneficiaries who signed the settlement documents, he was
fully informed and aware that the Slater Brothers had not signed releases and could still
sue him. [R. 933.]
Plaintiff now appeals that order.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Saul Breton Creates a Testamentary Grandchildren's Trust.
1.

In 1981, Saul Breton executed his will, in which there was created a

trust through which he intended to provide $1,000,000 for the benefit of his
grandchildren (the "Trust"). [R. 452-81, esp. 454-56.1]
2.

Saul Breton's four children—Neil Breton ("Plaintiff' or "Neil"),

William Breton ("Willie"), Jana Hadany, and Rhonda Slater—became co-trustees of the
Trust. [R.474.]
3.
B.

As of May 1994, the Trust had no assets. [R. 598.]

The Relationship between Plaintiff and the Slater Family "Completely
Deteriorates.55
4.

Also by the mid-1990s, Plaintiffs relationship with his sister,

Rhonda Slater, and her family "completely deteriorated." [R. 599.]
5.

The decline stemmed from "years of litigation," which included

litigation directly between Plaintiff and the Slaters, including a case in which Plaintiff
foreclosed on the Slaters' home. [R. 600-03, 613.]
6.

Plaintiff testified that his foreclosure on the Slaters' home was the

cause of the Slater Brothers' eventual lawsuit against Plaintiff, which they filed in 2007:

This document was authenticated at R. 620.

4
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[I]n my opinion, this is the whole genesis of why the grandkids [the Slater
Brothers] decided to pursue this lawsuit 15 years later, is because they were
told by their parents that Uncle Neil was throwing them out of their house
for no known reason, never explained, and they never, in their depositions,
ever asked once why they were packing up and leaving. They were just told
they were being thrown out on the street.
[R. 602.]
7.

The disputes and relations between Plaintiff and the Slaters became

so bitter that Mark Slater (Rhonda's husband) threatened to kill Neil. [R. 712.]
C.

Breton Slater Wants to Sue Plaintiff, but Lacks Financial Resources to
Do So.
8.

In May 1998, Rhonda Slater's oldest son and Plaintiffs nephew,

Breton Slater, graduated from high school and sent a letter to Plaintiff, Willie Breton and
Jana Hadany, inquiring whether Trust funds were available to help pay for his college
education. Breton Slater also requested an accounting of the Trust assets. [R. 442, 484,
638-39.]
9.

Plaintiff responded to Breton Slater's request. [R. 443, 487, 639.]

10.

Unsatisfied with Plaintiffs response, Breton Slater sent a second

|

letter to Plaintiff and Willie in June 1998, again requesting an accounting of Trust assets.
[R. 443, 490.]
11.

Willie Breton responded to Breton Slater's June 1998 letter. [See R.

493.]

<
12.

Breton Slater sent a third letter to Plaintiff and Willie on

September 10, 1998. Breton Slater threatened to sue for an accounting and to remove the
trustees if he did not receive a full accounting. [R. 444, 493.]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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13.

Plaintiff responded to Breton Slater's September 10, 1998 letter. [R.

14.

Breton Slater again felt that the response was insufficient as it "did

444, 496-98.]

not provide me with any real accounting in the form of financial statements or Trust or
business financial records prepared or reviewed by an accountant."

Breton Slater

believed Plaintiff was attempting to avoid the truth with "scribble talk." [R. 444; see also
R. 640, 643-45.]
15.

Through this correspondence, Breton Slater came to believe "that the

Trust, which was supposed to have started with $1,000,000 in assets, essentially had no
real assets." [R. 444; see also R. 634, 645.]
16.

Breton Slater also "believed that the trustees had mismanaged Trust

assets, breached fiduciary duties owed to the beneficiaries, and were attempting to hide
their mismanagement from the beneficiaries and [his] family." [R. 444, 633.]
17.

Breton Slater threatened to bring a suit against Plaintiff in 1998. [R.

490, 493, 604-06.]
18.

Breton Slater would have filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff in 1998,

but at the time, he did not have "the financial resources and legal assistance required."
Without financial means to hire a lawyer, he "felt helpless to seek any recourse against
what [he] believed was serious mismanagement of Trust assets by Neil, whom [he] did
not trust at all." [R. 444-45; see also R. 636, 640, 652-53.]

6
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D.

Plaintiff Retains Clyde Snow & Sessions to Draft Releases.
19.

In 2004 and 2005, Defendants advised and represented Plaintiff with

respect to his role as co-trustee of the Trust, his desire to make gifts from his personal
funds to the beneficiaries of the Trust to the end of resolving any outstanding issues and
potential claims of beneficiaries against the co-trustees of the Trust, and the termination
of the Trust. [R. 3.]
20.

Defendants, with input from Plaintiff and Willie Breton, drafted

release documents that were to be sent to all fifteen of the Trust beneficiaries. [R. 66267.]
21.

Plaintiff wanted to protect three of the co-trustees, Willie, Jana, and

himself, from any subsequent litigation.

Plaintiff wanted this plan to be an "all or

nothing" plan. Either all of the beneficiaries would release the co-trustees and all would
get payments or none would get payments. [R. 712-14.]
22.

In December 2004, the fifteen Trust beneficiaries, including the

Slater Brothers, received a letter from Plaintiff and Willie Breton, which discussed the
loss of the Trust assets and proposed a payment of $24,000 to each grandchild,
purportedly from Plaintiffs own personal assets ("Release Letter"). [R. 445, 501-03,
629-30.]
23.

Enclosed with the Release Letter were documents drafted by

Defendants entitled "Receipt and Release and Consent to Termination of Trust by Sworn
Statement" ("Release Documents"). [R. 445, 505-06, 629-30.]

7
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24.

The Release Letter informed the Trust beneficiaries that "[e]ach

payment [of $24,000 to each grandchild] would be conditioned upon each child and each
grandchild (or such legal guardian if under age 18) agreeing to the termination of the
Grandchildren's Trust and waiving all claims against the Trustees of the Grandchildren's
Trust." [R. 503.]
E.

Plaintiff Pays Twelve of the Trust Beneficiaries with Full Knowledge
that the Slater Brothers Had Not Signed Releases and Could Still Sue
Him.
25.

Twelve of the grandchildren signed the Release Documents. [See R.

26.

Although he knew that the Slater Brothers had not signed the

6.]

Release Documents, Plaintiff made the $24,000 distributions to each of the other twelve
signing beneficiaries in early February 2005. [R. 594, 609-11.]
27.

Plaintiff complains that Defendants did not tell him that he could not

distribute funds to the twelve beneficiaries who had signed the Release Documents
without violating the "all or nothing" plan. [R. 713.] Of course, this fact is plainly
obvious, and is something of which Plaintiff was fully informed and aware. Plaintiff
admits he already knew that, without the signed Release Documents, the Slater Brothers
were still free to sue him. [R. 611-13.]
28.

The decision to distribute funds to twelve of the beneficiaries despite

not having the three Slater Brothers' releases was made by Plaintiff, Willie, and Jana. [R.
610.]

8
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F.

The Slater Brothers Refuse to Sign Releases.
29.

The three Slater Brothers (Rhonda and Mark Slater's children)

indicated in June and July 2005 that they were going to sign the Release Documents. [R.
823-24.]
30.

In August or September 2005, Breton Slater began discussing the

issues surrounding the Trust with his paternal uncle, Mike Rosson. Mr. Rosson suggested
that Breton Slater sign the Release Documents if: (1) Plaintiff agreed to pay the Slater
Brothers $66,666.66 each (equal to 1/15 of the original $1,000,000 corpus of the trust),
and (2) Plaintiff provided full releases of any claims against Rhonda and Mark Slater
(something Plaintiff had previously proposed). [R. 446; see also R. 641-42, 776, 894.]
31.

In September 2005, Breton Slater sent an email to Plaintiff and

Willie Breton, in which Breton Slater offered to settle for payment of $66,666.66 to
himself and each of his brothers and full releases of his parents. [R. 446, 509.]
32.

Plaintiff did not accept Breton Slater's offer. [R. 447, 642.]

33.

The three Slater Brothers ultimately decided they would not sign the

Release Documents for several reasons: (1) lack of trust of Plaintiff; (2) negative feelings
toward Plaintiff due to past experiences between Plaintiff and the Slater family; (3) desire
to know the truth about the Trust assets and whether they had been misappropriated or
mismanaged; (4) disbelief that the $24,000 was really a gift from Plaintiff and belief that
the payment likely came from funds that should have belonged to the Trust; (5) offense at
the notion that Plaintiff would attempt to buy off the Trust beneficiaries; (6) lack of
interest in receiving any "gift" from Plaintiff; and (7) lack of interest in accepting
9
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$24,000 in exchange for signing the Release Documents. [R. 445, 576-77, 630-32, 64951.]
G.

The Slater Brothers Sue Plaintiff Using Funds Provided by Their Uncle
Mike Rosson.
34.

In 2004 and 2005, the Slater Brothers again considered suing

Plaintiff and Willie, and "the only reason [they] did not bring a lawsuit against Neil at
that time was [they] did not have any money or other resources with which to hire a
lawyer." [R. 445-46, 577, 636, 652-53.]
35.

Breton Slater continued to discuss the Trust with Mike Rosson, and

in 2006 or 2007, Mr. Rosson offered to pay an attorney so the Slater Brothers could bring
a lawsuit against Plaintiff. [R. 447, 636, 653.]
36.

The Slater Brothers accepted the offer and retained the law firm of

Christensen, Glaser, Fink, Jacobs, Weil & Shapiro ("Christensen Glaser") in California.
[R. 447, 577.]
37.

In June 2007, two and one half years after Defendants drafted the

Release Documents, Christensen Glaser filed a Petition against Plaintiff and Willie, on
behalf of the Slater Brothers, in the Superior Court for the State of California.

The

Petition alleged claims against Plaintiff and Willie for, among other things, breach of
fiduciary duties in mismanaging the Trust and its assets. [R. 447-48, 519-59, 578.]
38.

In about May 2008, Plaintiff paid $75,000.00 to each of the Slater

Brothers in settlement of their claims (for a total of $225,000.00). [R. 562-72, esp. 564,
621.]

10
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H.

The Slater Brothers Did Not Sue Plaintiff Because the Other Twelve
Beneficiaries' Releases Gave Them an "Economic Incentive."
39.

In this lawsuit (Neil Breton v. Clyde, Snow & Sessions), Plaintiff

alleges, "After the other 12 Receipts and Releases were signed, the Slater Boys claimed
that they were the sole beneficiaries of the Grandchildren's Trust. This result placed the
Slater Boys in an economically viable position to initiate the litigation against
[Plaintiff]." [R. 6.]
40.

Plaintiff testified, "I strongly believe that they [the Slater Brothers]

saw this consent and release where they believed that they were the only three
beneficiaries as their opportunity to finally use something that appeared to be a hammer
to have filed a lawsuit." [R. 615.]
41.

When asked in his deposition what evidence he had to support this

theory, Plaintiff could only state that "15 years went by without a correspondence or a
letter and within a very short period of time after getting these consent and releases," the
Slater Brothers decided to sue.

Plaintiff believes this is "not coincidental" and simply

states, "I take that all without any doubt in my mind whatsoever that they waited patiently
for the opportunity. That's my belief." [R. 615-16; see also R. 617-19.]
42.

The Slater Brothers testified that their decision to sue in 2007 was

motivated by their belief that Plaintiff and Willie had breached fiduciary duties by
mismanaging the Trust assets, as well as by the fact that they finally had financial
resources from Mike Rosson to pay for legal counsel. [R. 447, 578, 633-36, 652-53.]

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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43.

The three Slater Brothers each testified that the fact that the other

Trust beneficiaries may have signed the Release Documents was not a factor in their
decision to sue Plaintiff and Willie in 2007. [R. 447-48, 578, 635, 654-55.]
44.

The suggestion that the Slater Brothers sued the Plaintiff because

they believed they had an increased economic incentive to sue is not true.

Such

considerations did not enter the minds of the Slater Brothers and were not a factor in their
decision to sue Plaintiff and Willie Breton. [R. 447-48, 578, 635-36, 654-55.]
45.

Likewise, an alleged "economic incentive" to sue based on the

theory that the three Slater Brothers owned more than 3/15ths of the Trust had no impact
in Mr. Rosson's decision to fund the Slater Brothers' lawsuit. In fact, the "economic
incentive" theory never even entered Mr. Rosson's mind at any time. [R. 625.]
46.

In his sworn Affidavit, Breton Slater specifically stated:

At the time we retained the Christensen Glaser Law Firm and filed
the lawsuit against Neil and Willie, we had heard the other Trust
beneficiaries (Saul's other 12 grandchildren) had signed the Receipt
and Release documents, but we had never seen those signed
documents and were uncertain whether they had been signed.
Nevertheless, the fact that the other Trust beneficiaries had
purportedly signed the Receipt and Release documents was not even
the slightest factor in my decision or that of my brothers to sue Neil
and Willie. The notion that the other Trust beneficiaries may have
signed the Receipt and Release documents and had thereby given me
and my brothers an increased stake in the Trust, or a so-called
increased economic incentive to sue, is untrue. Such considerations
did not enter into my mind at the time I hired the Christensen Glaser
Law Firm and were not a factor in my decision or that of my
brothers to sue Neil and Willie.
[R. 447-48.] (Breton Slater Aff. 129.)
47.

Jordan Slater similarly stated:

12
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At the time we retained the Christensen Glaser law firm and filed the
lawsuit against Neil and Willie, I had heard the other Trust
beneficiaries had signed the Receipt and Release documents, but I
had never seen those signed documents and was uncertain whether
they existed. The fact that the other Trust beneficiaries had
purportedly signed the Receipt and Release documents was no factor
in my decision or that of my brothers to sue Neil and Willie. The
suggestion that the other Trust beneficiaries may have signed the
Receipt and Release documents and had thereby given me and my
brothers an increased stake in the Trust, or a so-called increased
economic incentive to sue, is untrue. Such a consideration did not
enter into my mind at the time I hired the Christensen Glaser law
firm and was not a factor in my decision or that of my brothers to
sue Neil and Willie.
[R. 578.] (Jordan Slater Aff. % 13.)
48.

Because they had financial resources that were previously

unavailable and because they believed Plaintiff and Willie had mismanaged the Trust
assets and breached their fiduciary duties, the Slater Brothers "would have sued Plaintiff
and Willie in 2007 regardless of whether or not the other Trust beneficiaries had signed
the Receipt and Release documents." [R. 448, 578; see also R. 633-36.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff was required to come forward
with some credible, admissible evidence that, but for Defendants' alleged negligence,
Plaintiff would have been better off. The trial court properly recognized that there is no
such evidence in this case.
Plaintiff has produced no evidence and can only speculate that the Slater Brothers
would not have sued him had Defendants drafted documents and advised Plaintiff as

13
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Plaintiff now claims they should have. All of the evidence shows that the alleged
negligence made no difference; the Slater Brothers would have sued Plaintiff anyway.
The trial court also properly ruled that Plaintiff caused his own damages. Plaintiff
is the one who made the decision to pay some of the Trust beneficiaries with full
knowledge that the Slater Brothers were still free to sue him. Plaintiffs own acts foiled
his desire for an "all or nothing" settlement. Plaintiff cannot be heard to complain that
Defendants failed to advise him of what he already knew.

Plaintiff also candidly

admitted that the Slater Brothers' lawsuit was caused by years of animosity between
Plaintiff and the Slater family, culminating in Plaintiff foreclosing on the Slaters5
residence and forcing the entire family out of their home.
The trial court's ruling was also correct because the evidence conclusively shows
that the Slater Brothers were never motivated to sue Plaintiff based on anything
Defendants did (or failed to do), or by any condition Defendants created. The Slater
Brothers all conclusively testified that they sued Plaintiff because he breached his
fiduciary duties as trustee of the Trust (or at least they so believed), and their Uncle Mike
Rosson finally provided the financial resources to sue Plaintiff in 2007. The alleged
economic incentive on which Plaintiffs causation theory relies was not even the slightest
factor in the Slater Brothers decision to sue Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence on which a reasonable juror could rule
in favor of Plaintiff on the necessary element of causation.

14
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE PROXIMATE CAUSE REQUIREMENT.
Proximate cause is an essential element of any legal malpractice claim, whether

the claim is asserted as negligence or breach of contract. See Christensen & Jensen, P.C.
v. Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, % 23-24, 194 P.3d 931 (a legal malpractice claim based
on breach of contract requires showing of "damages to the plaintiff resulting from the
breach11); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (a negligence claim against a
lawyer requires causal connection between the breach of duty and resulting injury);
Crestwood Cove Apts. Business Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, If 30, 164 P.3d 1247 (in a
legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must plead and prove "causal connection between
the breach of duty and the resulting injury").
"Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the
result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one that necessarily sets in
operation the factors that accomplish the injury." Harline, 912 P.2d at 439 (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). Proximate cause can be determined as a matter
of law on summary judgment when: (i) the facts are so clear that reasonable persons
could not disagree about the facts or the application of a legal standard to the facts, or (ii)
when facts are so tenuous that determining causation becomes speculative.

Id.;

Crestwood Cove, 2007 UT 48, f 32.
In a legal malpractice case, the Plaintiff must demonstrate both actual cause and
proximate cause. Actual cause is a showing that "but for the attorney's wrong the[]
15
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[client's] loss would not have occurred." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d
1283, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Plaintiff must also show "a reasonable likelihood that
[he] would have ultimately benefited." Id.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DEFFENDANTS'
ALLEGED CONDUCT DID NOT CAUSE PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGED
INJURY.
The trial court ruled:
The Court determines as a matter of law and undisputed fact that the
alleged conduct on the part of Defendants did not cause the alleged injury.
Defendants could not have possibly forced the Slater Brothers to sign the
releases. Moreover, it is undisputed, based on Plaintiffs own testimony,
that Plaintiff was fully informed and aware, when he paid $24,000 to each
of the twelve beneficiaries who had signed releases, that the Slater Brothers
had not signed any release and were still free to sue Plaintiff. Therefore,
the alleged failure to advise Plaintiff of something he fully understood did
not cause the alleged injury. Plaintiffs own decision . . . to pay $24,000 to
each of the signing beneficiaries without first obtaining releases from the
Slater Brothers was an independent and intervening cause of the alleged
injury.

[R. 933-34.]
The trial court was correct.

Plaintiffs' alleged damages were not caused by

anything Defendants did or failed to do.2 Rather, they were caused by his own actions
and the actions of the Slater Brothers, neither of which Defendants could control.

2

Because this appeal focuses only on causation, Defendants have not yet contested the
allegations that they were negligent and breached a contract. For the record, Defendants
do not admit that any of their conduct was negligent or otherwise wrongful even though
these issues are not now before the Court.
16
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A.

Defendants' Alleged Negligent Drafting and Failure to Provide Advice
Did Not Cause Plaintiffs Damages Because Defendants Could Not
Force the Slater Brothers to Sign the Release Documents and Plaintiff
was Fully Informed.

Plaintiff alleges he hired Defendants to "resolv[e] any outstanding issues and
resolv[e] any potential claims of [the] beneficiaries against the co-trustees of the Trust."
[R. 3.] To achieve this, Plaintiff claims he wanted an "all or nothing" plan, pursuant to
which all of the beneficiaries would sign releases or none of them would get paid. [R.
712-14.] Plaintiff claims Defendants' failure to draft "all or nothing" releases, together
with Defendants' failure to advise him against paying off some of the beneficiaries,
caused him damages. See, e.g., Appellant Br. at 20.
In order to prevail on this argument, Plaintiff must demonstrate that, but for the
alleged negligent drafting and failure to advise, Plaintiff would not have experienced a
loss and would likely have achieved a better outcome, i.e., that the Slater Brothers would
not have sued him. See Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1291. As the trial court recognized, there
is no such evidence in this case.
If the Court were to assume, for example, that Defendants had drafted perfectly
clear "all or nothing" Release Documents,3 there is no evidence that Plaintiff would likely
have achieved a better outcome.

There is no evidence to suggest that Plaintiff or

Defendants would have had better success persuading the Slater Brothers to sign more
"perfect" Release Documents. As the trial court correctly concluded, Defendants had no

3

Defendants do not concede that the Release Documents they drafted were not "all or
nothing" releases.
17
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power to force the Slater Brothers to sign any form of any release. [R. 933.] Likewise,
there is no evidence to suggest that the Slater Brothers would not have sued Plaintiff
regardless of the form of the Release Documents.
Moreover, the alleged negligent drafting did not cause Plaintiff to distribute
$24,000 to the other beneficiaries without first getting the Slater Brothers' signatures.
Plaintiff made that decision on his own, along with Willie and Jana. It was Plaintiffs
own act of distributing money to the twelve beneficiaries that foiled the "all or nothing"
plan. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did so with a full understanding that the Slater
Brothers were still free to sue him. [R. 611-13.] The trial court was correct in ruling that
Defendants cannot be held liable for failing to advise Plaintiff of something he already
fully understood. Cf. Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867, 868 (Utah 1978) (a property
owner has no duty to warn an invitee of an obvious dangerous condition). Had Plaintiff
not placed himself in the position of having paid off twelve of the beneficiaries while
knowing that the other three might sue him, he might have had an opportunity to realize
an "all or nothing" plan. But when Plaintiff made the decision to pay some, but not all,
of the beneficiaries, he caused his own desired outcome to fail.
The trial court was also correct in ruling that Plaintiffs own conduct was an
intervening cause of his own damages. "An intervening cause is an independent event,
not reasonably foreseeable, that completely breaks the chain of causation between fault
and damages." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1293. In the proper case, intervening cause can be
decided on summary judgment. See e.g., Ellertson, 576 P.2d at 868 (affirming summary
judgment ruling that plaintiffs own conduct was the intervening cause of injury);
18

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Crestwood Cove, 2007 UT 48, ]f 33, n. 45 (citing with approval a legal malpractice case
in which the court affirmed summary judgment because an intervening cause was the
proximate cause of the alleged damages).
Plaintiffs own act, unforeseen and not controlled by Defendants, is what caused
the all or nothing plan to fail. And, to the extent the "economic incentive" theory has any
legal validity (which it does not),4 Plaintiffs own act of paying off the twelve "releasing"
beneficiaries is what created the so-called "increased economic incentive" for the Slater
The argument that the Slater Brothers had a legal right to recover 100% of the damages
suffered by all 15 Trust beneficiaries at the hands of the co-trustees of the Trust is
incorrect as a matter of law. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts makes this clear. It
states, for example:
[T]he granting of a release by one or more of the beneficiaries does not
preclude other beneficiaries of the trust from holding the trustee liable for
the breach, insofar as their interests are affected.
4 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 97, cmt. c(l) (2012) (emphasis added). The
illustrations make clear that a non-releasing beneficiary is entitled to recover only that
beneficiary's share of the loss, and not the shares of loss belonging (or formerly
belonging) to the beneficiaries who released the trustee. See id., Illus. 6-8.
A comment to Section 78 of The Restatement (Third) of Trusts also states:
[I]f one or more but less than all of the beneficiaries consent to a prohibited
transaction, the transaction constitutes a breach of trust, although one for
which the trustee is not liable to any beneficiary from whom (or on whose
behalf) consent has been properly obtained.
3 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78, cmt. c (2007) (emphasis added); see also
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 216, cmt. c and illus. 8-9; Gaynor v. Payne, 804 A.2d
170, 174 (Conn. 2002) (successor executor could sue prior executor for breach of trust,
but only on behalf of non-settling contingent beneficiaries and not on behalf of
beneficiaries who had signed releases).
Thus, the trustee's liability is limited to the non-releasing beneficiary's share of
the loss.
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Brothers to sue. It is simply too far-fetched for any reasonable juror to conclude that
Defendants are liable for failing to advise Plaintiff of a legally incorrect theory that
Plaintiff brought upon himself and that was never the slightest factor in the Slater
Brothers' decision to sue.
Summary dismissal is also supported by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996). In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed
summary judgment in a legal malpractice case, holding as a matter of law that the
Plaintiff could not establish the essential element of causation. Id. at 444-46. The Court
held as a matter of law that the plaintiffs failure to obtain a bankruptcy discharge was
caused by the plaintiffs own acts, and not by any alleged failure on the part of the
lawyers involved. Id. Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Harline is unavailing because it is
undisputed that Plaintiff was fully informed of the possible result of paying the signing
beneficiaries without getting the Slater Brothers' signatures.

[R 611-13.] Like the

plaintiff in Harline, Plaintiff caused his own alleged damages and failed to come forward
with any evidence that would allow him to proceed on his theory of causation.
B.

There Is No Evidence to Support a Finding of Causation, and All
Available Evidence Conclusively Refutes a Finding of Causation.

The trial court's ruling is also supported by the fact that there is no evidence upon
which a jury could reasonably find causation. While the trial court did not expressly
support its ruling on this basis, this Court can and should do so. Harline, 912 P.2d at 438
(appellate courts "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to
the trial court, even if it is not one relied on below") (citations omitted).
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Because Plaintiff would bear the burden of proof at trial, Plaintiff "must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT
2, If 18, 177 P.3d 600. The trial court was required to draw reasonable factual inferences
in Plaintiffs favor, but it was not required to draw every possible inference of fact, no
matter how remote or improbable, in Plaintiffs favor. IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D&K
Mgmt, Inc., 2008 UT 73, | 19, 196 P.3d 588. On summary judgment the Court must
apply an "objective standard, seek[ing] to find whether reasonable jurors, properly
instructed, would be able to come to only one conclusion." Clegg v. Wasatch County,
2010 UT 5, Tf 15, 227 P.3d 1243. In this case, there is not enough evidence on which a
reasonable juror could find in Plaintiffs' favor on the essential element of causation.
Plaintiffs loss causation theory is dependent on evidence that the Slater Brothers
were motivated to sue based on the alleged increased economic incentive. [See R. 6
(Plaintiffs Complaint, alleging "Defendants' scheme created a perfect opportunity and a
significant economic incentive for the Slater Boys to initiate litigation against Neil and
William"); Appellant Br. at 20-22 ("Defendants' malpractice . . . caused the Slater Boys
to believe that they held 100% interest in the GC Trust, providing them with the
economic incentive to sue Neil, causing his damages.").]

The undisputed evidence

demonstrates that Plaintiffs causation theory is false.
1.

The only competent witnesses have conclusively testified they
were not motivated by the alleged "economic incentive."

First, the Slater Brothers are the only witnesses competent to testify about what
motivated them to sue Plaintiff. They have each unequivocally testified that the so-called
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increased economic incentive played absolutely no role in their decision to sue Plaintiff.
[R. 447-48, 578, 635-36, 654-55.] For example, Breton Slater testified:
[T]he fact that the other Trust beneficiaries had purportedly signed the
Receipt and Release documents was not even the slightest factor in my
decision or that of my brothers to sue Neil and Willie. The notion that the
other Trust beneficiaries may have signed the Receipt and Release
documents and had thereby given me and my brothers an increased stake in
the Trust, or a so-called increased economic incentive to sue, is untrue.
Such considerations did not enter into my mind at the time I hired the
Christensen Glaser Law Firm and were not a factor in my decision or that
of my brothers to sue Neil and Willie.
[R. 447-48.] The other two Slater Brothers gave similar testimony. [R. 578, 654-55.]
The Slater Brothers' uncontroverted testimony is corroborated by the fact that they
had wanted to sue Plaintiff for many years prior to actually suing him. [See, e.g., R. 44445, 577, 636, 652-53.] It was not until they finally received financial backing from their
Uncle Mike Rosson that they were able to do so, and they sued Plaintiff within months of
obtaining their uncle's financial support. [See R. 447, 519-59, 578, 636, 653.]
The Slater Brothers explained the factors that did motivate them to sue Plaintiff.
First, they believed Plaintiff has mismanaged the Trust. [E.g., R. 444.] Those desires
and beliefs were fueled by years of animosity between Plaintiff and the Slater family,
including numerous prior lawsuits, a foreclosure action in which the Slater Brothers were
told Plaintiff "thr[ew] them out of their house for no known reason," and even a threat by
Mark Slater to kill Plaintiff. [See, e.g. R. 599, 600-03, 613, 712.] The alleged increased
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economic incentive to sue, a theory that is legally wrong,5 had nothing to do with the
Slater Brothers' decision to sue. [R. 447-48, 578, 635-36, 654-55.]
2.

Plaintiff admitted the past animosity between himself and the
Slaters caused the lawsuit that led to his damages.

Plaintiff even admitted in candor that the cause of the Slater Brothers' lawsuit was
the fact that Plaintiff had previously foreclosed on the Slaters' family residence:
[I] n my opinion, this is the whole genesis of why the grandkids decided to
pursue this lawsuit 15 years later, is because they were told by their parents
that Uncle Neil was throwing them out of their house for no known reason,
never explained, and they never, in their depositions, ever asked once why
they were packing up and leaving. They were just told they were being
thrown out on the street.
[R. 602.]
By Plaintiffs own admission the "proximate cause" of his injury - the "cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence . . . produced [his] injury" - was his own bitter
litigious history against the Slater family.

See Harline, 912 P.2d at 439 (defining

proximate cause) (citations omitted).
3.

Plaintiff failed to produce any actual evidence to support his
causation theory.

Plaintiff had a fair opportunity during discovery to bring forward evidence to
prove his economic incentive theory of causation but, in addition to refuting it with his
own testimony as just described, he failed to support it. During his deposition, Plaintiff
was specifically asked what evidence he had to support his economic incentive theory.

5

See supra note 4.
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His only answer did not provide any admissible evidence that the Slater Brothers were
somehow motivated to sue based on an increased economic incentive. [See R. 615-19.]
4.

All of Plaintiffs remaining arguments are based on speculation,
unsupported by admissible evidence.

In the trial court, Plaintiff attempted to avoid his complete lack of admissible
evidence by weaving together arguments based on speculation and conjecture. Under
Utah law, however, mere speculation cannot be used to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. See, e.g., Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 893 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (upholding summary judgment where there was no direct evidence of causation
and the jury would be left to speculate regarding proximate cause).
In Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake Bus. Dist, 2005 UT App 489, 126 P.3d 781, the
plaintiff asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with
prospective economic relations, but his theory of causation was based solely on the
timing of the opening of the defendant's competing theater, and on a corresponding drop
in revenue at the plaintiffs theater. Id. ^ 15. The Utah Court of Appeals held that this
circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to create a material dispute because without
any other evidence, the circumstantial evidence would require the jury to "engage in rank
speculation to reach a verdict regarding causation." Id. f 14 (internal quotations omitted).
Like the plaintiff in Triesault, Plaintiff relied on chronology in the trial court to
attempt to establish a factual dispute regarding the Slater Brothers' motivation for their
suit.

[R. 692-95.]

The Slater Brothers, however, are the only people who can

competently testify regarding their motivation, and they have directly stated under oath
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that they sued because they believed Plaintiff violated his fiduciary duties. They further
testified that they did not even consider the alleged economic incentive. Mike Rosson
has also testified that the alleged economic incentive never entered his mind. Although
Plaintiff asserts that the chronology supports his theory, with sworn statements to the
contrary a jury would have to speculate to conclude that the Slater Brothers and Mike
Rosson are simply lying in their affidavits and sworn testimony. Such speculation is not
sufficient to refute the sworn statements made by both the Slater Brothers and Mike
Rosson, especially since the chronology in this case is consistent with the sworn
testimony. The chronology confirms that the Slater Brothers did not bring suit until they
had definite funding for the litigation in 2007, funding that had previously been
unavailable. The chronology also establishes that the Slater Brothers did not initiate their
suit until June 2007. If the Slater Brothers were truly motivated by the alleged economic
incentive—allegedly created by Defendants' actions in 2004—they would have had no
reason to wait over two years to initiate their suit.
Plaintiff also asserted in the trial court that the Slater Brothers had relatives who
could have financed a suit long before 2007.

[R. 676, 693.] Plaintiff provided no

evidence, direct or circumstantial, that any relative was actually willing to finance a suit
against Plaintiff, or the Slater Brothers actually believed they could rely on these
speculative financial sources. The only evidence is that the Slater Brothers believed they
did not have the financial resources to bring suit until their Uncle Mike offered to help.
[R. 444-47, 636, 640, 652-53.] Plaintiffs conclusory argument that the Slater Brothers
could have used other people's money to fund a suit, unsupported by any evidence, is not
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sufficient to raise a genuine dispute. See Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT
69,f 34, 54 P.3d 1054 (conclusory assertions insufficient to demonstrate the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact).
Plaintiff also cited to the California litigation for the proposition that the Slater
Brothers believed they held a 100% interest in the Trust. [R. 689, 695, 860-73.] Any
such "belief on the part of the Slater Brothers is immaterial because all of the admissible
evidence conclusively demonstrates that any such "belief had no bearing on the decision
to sue. Moreover, the California Petition does not support Plaintiffs argument. In the
Petition, the Slater Brothers merely allege that the other beneficiaries had released their
interest in the Trust by signing the Release Documents. There is no specific allegation
that the Slater Brothers believed that they held 100% interest in the Trust corpus. [See R.
860-73.] In fact, in 2005, the Slaters offered to settle for their pro rata shares of the
intended original $1,000,000 Trust. [R. 446, 509, 654-55.]
Plaintiff further attempted to create a factual dispute by arguing that the Slater
Brothers' beliefs regarding the alleged mismanagement of the Trust were not valid and
was not based on a complete investigation. [R. 674-75.] The critical point on the issue of
causation, however, is not whether Plaintiff actually mismanaged Trust funds, but
whether the Slater Brothers believed Plaintiff had mismanaged the Trust. As early as
1998, Breton Slater requested an accounting of the Trust because he believed Plaintiff
had mismanaged the Trust. [R. 442-44, 484, 490, 493.] The Slater Brothers continuously
held to this belief [Id; see also R. 445-47, 577-78, 633-36, 652-53.] It is irrelevant, and
therefore immaterial, whether Plaintiff did or did not mismanage the Trust or whether
26
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Breton Slater did or did not investigate before forming his beliefs. Even if these beliefs
were mistaken or premature, the Slater Brothers nonetheless held these beliefs and were
motivated by them.
Finally, Plaintiff attacked the Slaters' credibility regarding their motivation to sue.
Plaintiffs primary example was that one of the three brothers, Breton Slater, was not
telling the truth in a 1998 letter he wrote to Plaintiff. [R. 675.] In that letter Breton
Slater, who was 18 years old at the time, stated that a law student at UCLA law school
helped him find some legal authorities regarding his rights as a trust beneficiary. [R.
490.] When placed under oath to testify about this letter years later, Breton Slater
admitted that he did not go to the UCLA law school and had not read the legal citations
used in his letter. He testified that he put those statements in the letter so it would
"resound more with Neil and Willie" rather than having an 18-year-old try to explain his
legal rights. [R. 730, 740-41.]
Had one or more of the Slater Brothers given inconsistent sworn testimony on a
material fact, Plaintiff might then be able to argue that the Slaters' credibility on material
issues precludes summary judgment. See, e.g., Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT App 216, ^
14, 239 P.3d 519 (moving party's contentions rested on inconsistencies regarding a
material fact between a witness's affidavit and deposition testimony).

In this case,

however, all of Breton Slater's alleged "untruths" are inconsequential and wholly
irrelevant to anything in this case, and Breton Slater has consistently testified under oath
regarding all of the facts material to this case. Plaintiff cannot point to any genuinely
inconsistent sworn statements by any witness, let alone inconsistent statements regarding
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any material fact. Plaintiff has not cited to any case, and Defendants are not aware of
any, that would preclude summary judgment where the alleged inconsistent statement
relates to an unsworn statement on a wholly inconsequential and irrelevant matter.
Although circumstantial evidence may be sufficient in some cases to rebut a
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs allegations and circumstantial arguments fall
short on the issue of causation in this case. The material facts instead conclusively
establish that the Slater Brothers were motivated to sue Plaintiff because of past family
animosity and because they believed Plaintiff had breached his fiduciary duties. With
this evidence directly refuting the "economic incentive" theory, Plaintiff cannot sustain
his burden on the element of causation.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he would have been in any better position if
Defendants had not committed the alleged negligence or breach of contract. All of the
evidence demonstrates that the Slater Brothers sued Plaintiff in spite of Defendants'
alleged conduct, and not because of it. No reasonable juror could rule in Plaintiffs favor.
The judgment of the trial court should therefore be affirmed.
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Westlaw.
Page 1
924 P.2d 354
(Cite as: 924 P.2d 354)

llOXXIVfL) 11 Parties Entitled to Allege

H

Error

Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
Jeffery Earl SOUTH and Dianna South, Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 950066.
Aug. 30, 1996.
Defendants were convicted in the First Circuit
Court, Cache County, Burton H. Harris, J., of possession of controlled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia within 1,000 feet of church. The Court
of Appeals, 885 P.2d 795, reversed. State's petition for
writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court,
Stewart. Associate C. J., held that even though state did
not cross-appeal, Court of Appeals should have considered state's proffered alternative ground for affirmance that was raised below.
Reversed and remanded.
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If appellees or respondents merely desire affirmance of lower court's judgment, they need not, and
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Judgment or decision may be based on any
number of subsidiary rulings or grounds, but as long
as that judgment or decision produces distinct and
tangible result, it is only result which requires appeal,
cross-appeal, petition for certiorari, or cross-petition.
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110kll36 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
If litigants wish to attack judgment of lower court
for purposes of enlarging their own rights or lessening
rights of their opponent, they are required to
cross-appeal or cross-petition.
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1 lQkl 136 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
On appeal of trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress evidence, Court of Appeals should
have considered state's proffered alternative ground
for affirmance that was raised below, even though
state did not cross-appeal, but rather made the argument in its brief.
*354 Jan Graham. Atty. Gen., Todd A. Utzinger.
Carol Clawson. Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, and
Patrick B. Nolan, Jeffrey R. Burbank, Scott L. Wvatt
Logan, for plaintiff.
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Nathan D. Hult, Logan, and Jensie L. Anderson,
ACLU, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice:
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the issue of whether a successful
party in the trial court must file a cross-appeal to argue
a ground for affirmance other than the ground relied
on by the trial court. In the district court, Jeffery Earl
South and Dianna South moved to suppress evidence
of contraband seized at their residence in Logan, Utah,
asserting that the warrant under which the evidence
was seized did not authorize a search of their residence. The trial court agreed but denied their motion
on the basis of the "plain smell" exception to the
warrant requirement. The Souths appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's
ruling on the *355 "plain smell" issue. On that appeal,
the State argued that the trial court had erred in holding the warrant invalid, but because the State had
failed to cross-appeal the trial court's ruling on that
issue, the Court of Appeals refused to consider it as an
alternative ground for affirmance of the district court's
judgment. We reverse the Court of Appeals.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 15, 1992, a Logan City police detective
went to the Souths' residence to investigate a reported
theft of a cellular phone. When Jeffery South answered the door, the detective smelled the odor of
burnt marijuana emanating from his residence and
from his clothing. Shortly thereafter, the detective
obtained a search warrant. The warrant expressly
permitted a search of the persons at the Souths' address
but did not authorize a search of the premises. ^ The
detective returned to the Souths' residence accompanied by three other officers. A search of the premises
led to the confiscation of controlled substances and
drug paraphernalia. Prior to trial, defendants moved to
suppress this evidence, asserting that the warrant was
defective because it authorized a search of the persons
present but not of the premises. The trial court agreed
that the warrant was "defective" ^ but ruled that the
evidence was nevertheless admissible under the "plain
smell" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. State v. South 885 P.2d 795, 797
(Ct.App.1994). cert, granted, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah
1995}; see also State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969. 972-73
(Utah Ct.App. 19921 (describing plain smell doctrine).

FN1. The State contends that this limitation
in the scope of the warrant was merely the
result of a technical oversight.
FN2. The trial court employed this term in its
memorandum decision, and the Court of
Appeals generally noted that the trial court
had found the warrant to be "invalid." These
terms, however, may be somewhat misleading. It does not appear that the trial court
found there was an insubstantial basis for
issuing the warrant. Rather, according to the
trial court, the express terms of the warrant
"through inadvertence" did not permit as
extensive a search as was actually conducted.
Thus, it appears the actual basis for the trial
court's ruling was that the search exceeded
the scope of a valid warrant.
The Souths appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
State did not cross-appeal but instead argued in its
brief that the trial court had erred in holding the search
warrant invalid. The Court of Appeals refused to address this argument, holding that the State must raise
the issue on cross-appeal rather than simply presenting
it as an argument in a responsive brief. South. 885 P.2d
at 798.
II. DISCUSSION
[1][2] The question we address here is a narrow
one: whether a responding party must file a
cross-appeal or a cross-petition to raise an argument
which was also raised below and which is offered
merely as a ground for affirming the decision below.— Although we are not bound by federal court
decisions on this issue, to the extent that we find a
federal approach to the problem useful and persuasive,
we are free to adopt that approach. Plumb v. State. 809
P,2d734, 741 (Utah 1990). The seminal case treating
the issue of when a cross-appeal must be filed is
Langnesv. Green. 282 U.S. 531. 538-39. 51 S.Ct. 243,
246. 75 L.Ed. 520(1931). In brief, the Langnes doctrine requires litigants to cross-appeal or cross-petition
if they wish to attack a judgment of a lower court for
the purpose of enlarging their own rights or lessening
the rights of their opponent. Id; *356 Terry v, Zions
Coop. Mercantile Inst. 617 P.2d 700. 701 (Utah
1980). Conversely, if appellees or respondents merely
desire the affirmance of the lower court's judgment,
they need not, and should not, cross-appeal or
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cross-petition. "The practical justification for the rule
is that a party satisfied with the action of a lower court
should not have to appeal from it in order to defend a
judgment in his or her favor on any ground no matter
what an adversary does." Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice 364 (7th ed. 1993). Nor should a
party be allowed to employ its adversary's appeal or
petition as a vehicle to gain a greater benefit than that
granted below. Unnecessary cross-appeals also multiply the number of briefs filed and lead to confusion
of the issues presented. See, e.g., Pearl v. Keystone
Consol Indus.. Inc.. 884 F.2d 1047. 1053 (7th
Cir,1989): Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, inc., 815 F.2d
429. 439 (7th Cir.1987). The Langnes rule is thus
grounded in fairness, common sense, and judicial
efficiency.1^4
FN3. We do not here address the question of
whether an appellee may raise an argument
in defense of the lower court's judgment
when that argument was not presented in the
lower court. We do note, however, that our
previous opinions on that question have been
somewhat inconsistent. See, e.g., Buehner
Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892.
894-95 (Utah 1988) (applying argument
raised for first time on appeal to affirm lower
court's decision); American Coal Co. v.
Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1. 4 (Utah 1984)
(holding that argument offered in defense of
decision below had been waived when not
raised below); L & M Corp. v. Loader. 688
P,2d 448. 449-50 (Utah 1984) (refusing to
address argument offered on appeal in defense of lower court's decision where that
argument was not raised in pleadings or argued by parties below); Branch v. Western
Petroleum. Inc.. 657 P.2d 267. 276 (Utah
1982) (holding that appellate court, in affirming trial court's decision, may rely in part
on a ground not presented to trial court).
FN4. Since deciding Langnes, the United
States Supreme Court has articulated a few
clarifications or exceptions. The exceptions,
however, relate only to a limited number of
discrete circumstances, such as claims of
improper venue or untimeliness, and to the
rare occasion when, although an appellee
does not request a change in the lower court's
decision, the appellee's argument would

nevertheless logically require that the lower
court's decision be modified. See Robert L.
Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice 364-65
(7th ed. 1993). None of these circumstances
applies to this case, and the Souths' reliance
on them is misplaced.
Before the Court of Appeals, the State argued that
the omission in the warrant of authorization to search
the premises was a technical defect not requiring
suppression. Even though the trial court had expressly
rejected this contention in its memorandum decision,
the State argued it on appeal as an alternate ground for
affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. The State relied on the principle that appellate
courts may "affirm the trial court's decision to admit
evidence on any proper grounds, even though the trial
court assigned another reason for its ruling." State v.
Gallegos. 712 P.2d 207. 209 (Utah 1985); see also
O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 1139,
1141 (Utah 1991): Buehner Block Co. v. UWC
Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892. 894-95 & n. 2 (Utah 1988):
State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d 257. 260 (Utah 1985); In re
Estate of Hock. 655 P.2d 1111. 1114 (Utah 1982):
Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine. 595 P.2d 860. 861 (Utah
1979). But see Henrettv v. Manti City Corp.. 791 P.2d
506. 511 (Utah 1990): American Coal Co. v.
Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1. 4 (Utah 1984).^
FN5. Henretty treated the issue of whether
Manti City had properly created a special
improvement district for a designated section
of highway. The plaintiffs in the case opposed the city's proposed "improvements."
Before the district court, the plaintiffs argued
both a substantive and a procedural ground as
a basis for depriving the proposed improvement district of jurisdiction to act. The district court rejected the substantive ground but
accepted the procedural argument and ruled
that the improvement district had not been
properly constituted. Manti City appealed,
and the plaintiffs raised the substantive argument as part of a purported cross-appeal.
In so doing, the plaintiffs relied entirely on
their claim of a timely cross-appeal and did
not present the substantive ground as an alternate ground for decision. This Court reversed the trial court's ruling on the procedural issue and then considered the plaintiffs'
cross-appeal. Henretty. 791 P.2d at 510-11.
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Even though the plaintiffs were not seeking
to change the outcome in the trial court, we
refused to consider the substantive argument
because the cross-appeal had not been timely
filed.
Sandstrom was a procedurally complex
workers' compensation case. In short, the
issue on writ of review to this Court was
whether the Second Injury Fund was required to provide reimbursement to the
State Insurance Fund for certain payments
the latter had made to Sandstrom. The Industrial Commission, affirming an administrative law judge's decision, ruled that the
Second Injury Fund was not liable for
reimbursement. On review before this
Court, the Industrial Commission was
joined as a defendant. We reversed.
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d at 3-4. In so doing,
we refused to consider the Industrial
Commission's statute of limitations argument, which it offered as an alternate
ground for affirming its decision. However, the Second Injury Fund never offered
that argument on its own behalf, and we
held that failure to present it below constituted waiver. Id. at 4. In dicta, we then
stated that the issue could not have been
raised without a cross-appeal. Id. Thus,
both Henretty and Sandstrom adopted
holdings primarily based on the failure of
the appropriate party to raise an argument
at the appropriate time rather than on this
Court's ability to address arguments rejected by a lower adjudicator.
To the extent those cases suggested the
necessity of a cross-appeal or a
cross-petition where an argument is raised
and rejected below and no change to the
judgment is sought, we disavow that implication.
*357 The Court of Appeals ruled that because
"defendants in this case are challenging the legality of
the warrantless search-a question quite different than
the validity of the warrant," the State was raising an
argument that was not "related to the ruling being
appealed." South, 885 P.2d at 798. The Court of Appeals thus apparently presumed that the trial court's

rulings on the "plain smell" issue and the validity of
the warrant constituted distinct judgments or decisions
and the Langnes doctrine therefore could not apply.
[31 [4] We disagree. The Court of Appeals' reasoning simply becomes mired in the semantics of what
it labels a "ruling" as opposed to a "ground" for decision. " 'Failure to observe the distinction between a
contention, argument, or theory, on the one hand, and
a claim on the other, is responsible for much of the
confusion in the cases on the subject of the necessity
for cross-appeals.' " Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme
Court Practice 767 (quoting 9 James W. Moore &
Bernard J. Ward, Moore's Federal Practice f
204.11[3], at 934 (1973)). In determining what constitutes a separate ground for decision, it is not the
applied terminology that is important, but rather the
substance of the trial court's decision. Langnes. 282
U.S. at 538-39, 51 S.Ct. at 246. A judgment or decision ^ may be based on any number of subsidiary
rulings or grounds, but as long as that judgment or
decision produces a distinct and tangible result, it is
only the result which requires an appeal, a
cross-appeal, a petition for certiorari, or a
cross-petition. w Id. In short, it is the outcome upon
which the focus must be brought to bear, not the reasoning employed to reach the outcome.
FN6. The flexibility of these terms, depending upon the legal context, does indeed produce a certain degree of confusion. The term
"judgment," for instance, has been employed
variously to describe interlocutory decisions,
verdicts, and verdicts accompanied by remedies or punishments. It thus becomes all the
more important to focus on the rationale behind the governing rule rather than according
any talismanic significance to the words
employed.
FN7. Of course we do not here imply that the
Langnes doctrine in any way restricts our
discretionary power, when we grant a petition for certiorari, to limit the issues that will
be treated.
In this regard, it is helpful to examine the result
that each party was seeking in this case. The Souths
desired suppression of the evidence, and the State
desired that the evidence be admitted. To prevail, the
Souths had to convince the trial court to reject all the
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State's potential justifications for the search. The
State, on the other hand, needed only to demonstrate
one valid, independently supportable justification for
the search. As a practical matter, it was of little consequence to either the Souths or the State that the trial
court rejected the warrant argument but accepted the
"plain smell" argument, rather than the other way
around. The result was the same, and in responding to
the Souths' appeal, the State was not seeking to change
it. The State merely offered another line of reasoning
which, if accepted, would result in precisely the same
outcome as that originally granted by the trial court:
admission of the contested evidence.
We therefore reverse and remand to the Court of
Appeals for consideration of the State's proffered
alternative ground for affirming the trial court's ruling.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J.,
RUSSON. JJ„ concur.

HOWE. DURHAM

and

Utah, 1996.
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